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The article analyses the global South‘s role in disarmament. It offers the evidence of a 
customarily ignored Southern agency in UN processes and suggests that the work of the 
later Hans Morgenthau explains both this agency and contrary state policies. The article 
looks at the recent agreement with Iran as an example of constructive convergence and 
sets out the structure of an emerging and Southern-supported disarmament initiative. 
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This article aims to fill a gap in the disarmament literature concerning the global South‘s 
contribution to collective efforts in UN and international circles. It also discusses the 
relevance of Hans Morgenthau‘s later work regarding analyses and politics of this issue. The 
essay begins with an overview of how scholars have viewed the global South‘s involvement 
in disarmament. It then discusses the current state of disarmament affairs and Morgenthau‘s 
neglected later views about it before examining in depth Southern activism. Tensions between 
politics and ideals precede a conclusion focusing on the possibilities for a renewed activism 
emanating from the global South.  
 
Academic views about the global South and disarmament  
 
Southern states have been important in many disarmament processes.
1
 Despite 
journals such as Third World Quarterly, International Relations (IR) as a whole, however, has 
given inadequate attention both to the global South and to disarmament. This can be seen as 
part of a generalized lack of scholarly attention to The South in World Politics.
2
 As Sally 
Morphet notes, the dynamic role of Southern countries shaping the international political 
agenda tends to be overlooked.
3
 
The limitations of the concept of ‗the South‘ as a collective noun or even just as an organised 
political entity pursuing common goals and sharing the same values are well known and duly 
acknowledged. This article does not ignore the divisions running deep among Southern 
countries or that common positions do not necessarily reflect common interests. However, the 
concept of ‗the South‘ is useful to explore Southern individual agency in our analyses.  
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This article examines four academic journals (Millennium, Review of International 
Studies, International Studies Quarterly, and World Politics) to determine the extent to which 
the topic of disarmament receives scholarly attention. It fundamentally is an examination of 
discourse systems of signification through looking for a key term: ‗disarmament‘ and its 
related and contested counterpart ‗arms control‘.4 
A survey of the Millennium illustrates the near invisibility of disarmament in the 
academy. This journal is especially useful for our purposes. First, it is highly regarded in IR. 
Second, it has a large number of articles and book reviews. Third, it has an editorial board of 
students that rotates each year making it less prone to editorial stasis and more open to a 
variety of ideas. Fourth, its theoretical perspective is generally critical and constructivist in 
nature tending to make it more receptive to ideas critical of established Western orthodoxy. 
However, the evidence demonstrates a self-imposed silence within Millennium on the subject 
of disarmament. 
From 1971 to 2010, out of more than 4,000 articles and book reviews, only 25 
included ‗arms control‘ in the title, with 14 ‗disarmament‘ (hence, 39 in total).5 Table 1 




Table 1: Millennium 
 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total 
‗Arms Control‘ 2 13 9 1 25 
‗Disarmament‘ 4 5 3 2 14 
Total 6 18 12 3 39 
 
However, to retain focus on the key issue here, the number of articles and book 
reviews is less than 1 per cent of the total articles in the journal. The near vacuum on 
disarmament indicates not a failure of a journal but of the discipline whose yearly ebbs and 
flows ensure a regular and frequent influx of what is new. Intriguingly, in 2011 a Millennium 
prize was awarded to an article on disarmament. However, this contemporary soloist does not 
fill the near silence of the previous forty years. 
 
The critical and constructivist approaches of the journal seek to develop alternatives 
to mainstream realism and liberalism. Thus, it occupies a space where one might find 
intellectual voices that are in harmony with the view of the wider international community of 
states at the United Nations, especially of the General Assembly but at variance with 
dominant views within the major powers. A normative rationale or explanation can be found 
in the critique of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School that argues that the 
theory creates that which it is supposed to reduce.
7
 In other words, it seems preferable to hope 
a problem goes away by ignoring it.  
 
 
The same exercise was repeated with three other mainstream IR journals: Review of 
International Studies, International Studies Quarterly, and World Politics. The results were 
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even more striking than in Millennium. Table 2 shows that the Review of International Studies 
published only two articles with ‗arms control‘ in the title and two with ‗disarmament‘ — or 
four pieces in almost a half-century. Table 3 documents that International Studies Quarterly 
in a longer period only had a total of five articles, two including ‗disarmament‘ and three 
‗arms control‘. Table 4 shows that World Politics, in close to seven decades, had 16 articles, 
eight each with ‗arms control‘ or ‗disarmament‘. 
 
Table 2: Review of International Studies 
 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Total 
‗Arms 
Control‘ 0 1 0 0 1 2 
‗Disarmament
‘ 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Total 0 1 0 2 1 4 
 
Table 3: International Studies Quarterly 
 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Total 
‗Arms 
Control‘ 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 
‗Disarmam
ent‘ 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 
 
Table 4: World Politics 
 
  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Total 
‗Arms 
Control‘ 0 5 1 1 0 1 0 8 
‗Disarma
ment‘ 2 5 0 0 1 0 0 8 
Total 2 10 1 1 1 1 0 16 
 
This limited attention given to disarmament by IR scholars has resulted in an 
intellectual gap in which the global South‘s role in setting the disarmament agenda and 
shaping UN-backed policy responses to disarmament issues have gone unnoticed. In fact, 
despite the intense diplomatic activity on disarmament affairs in the foreign policies of all 
countries, IR analysts have mainly treated the global South as a marginal and passive actor 
that largely reacts to changes brought about by the North rather than an agent of change 
influencing the conduct of world politics. The global South receives more attention in 
economic and development studies and postcolonial studies but not so much in security and 
strategic studies except for terrorism and political violence studies. 
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During the Cold War, scholarly attention focused on analytical frameworks to better 
understand East-West political and security dynamics, which left little room for analysing the 
South‘s impact on international relations. Southern countries in this period are usually seen in 
terms of their affiliation with either the Western or Eastern bloc. Following this logic, their 
role in the conduct of world politics merely reflected the interests of their affiliated blocs and 
did not conceive the pursuit of separate objectives, especially with regards to disarmament.
9
 
In other words, the countries of the global South were considered as proxies that superpowers 
could use as they saw fit in their deadly game of planetary chess.
10
 This assumption has 
contributed to perpetuating the idea that the global South did not count in the conduct of 
world politics and that Southern countries were disposable assets that were only meant to 
serve the North‘s interests.11  
 
At the heart of this lack of academic interest in disarmament is a clear 
misunderstanding of achievements.  Initiatives of the global South in disarmament, if at all 
acknowledged, are pictured as background noise coming from a crowd being mildly 
dissatisfied about the status quo and whose expectations are to be managed rather than taken 
into account by the North. Moreover, the South‘s perceived potential for meaningful 
collective action on superpowers‘ business was deemed negligible. However, when looked at 
it more closely, Morphet is closer to the mark:  
 
[T]hrough its assertion of growing strength, particularly in the General Assembly but 
also the UN agencies, developing countries were able to pass seminal resolutions that 
effectively took the moral initiative away from the West by ‗grafting‘ their aims within 




A more thorough study of UN disarmament policies will show that the global South 
has been successful in bringing its interest on disarmament into UN frameworks and 
influential in crafting UN disarmament policies in line with its aims, as well as generating 
momentum for multilateral disarmament agreements. Indeed, from the outset the global 
South developed its own conception of disarmament issues partly based on a sense of military 
vulnerability vis-à-vis the North; a common understanding that their faith, in the event of a 
nuclear war, was intrinsically linked as none of them could have escaped the consequences of 
nuclear explosions; and a common humanitarian interpretation of the principles set forth in 
the UN Charter.
13
 This was notably reflected by the first NAM statement in 1961 and its 
emphasis on general and complete disarmament. 
 
This article demonstrates that Southern countries have been active in disarmament 
affairs and have often influenced the outcome of negotiations, thereby having an impact as 
the result of which Northern countries have renounced the use of certain types of weapons 
and indirectly reshaped military strategies and security policies. Their involvement in 
disarmament and weapons controls more generally, at times clashing with each other, takes 
different forms. Some initiatives are the result of individual efforts as shown by the Costa 
Rican experience with the export controlling, Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the leadership of 
the then Costa Rican president and Nobel laureate Oscar Arias, who brought the issue of arms 
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trade to the UN negotiating table. Others reflect regional efforts as demonstrated by the five 
nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) treaties (Bangkok Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Treaty of 
Rarotonga, Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central 
Asia), where regional groups of states have taken a legally binding decision to prohibit the 
emplacement of nuclear weapons on their territory. And still others reflect transnational 
efforts as shown by the NAM experience and the movement‘s continual efforts towards 
nuclear disarmament that contributed to the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty. All those efforts, individual or collective, initiated or followed, successful or less 
successful deserve more in-depth documentation and analysis. 
 
An intriguing illustration of the implications of regional processes relates to a global 
political and social process concerned with nuclear war. Thus, the Latin American Treaty of 
Tlatelolco was profoundly influenced by the effect of the Cuban Missile crisis on regional 
populations and governments that had until then seen the nuclear confrontation as a US-
Soviet affair. In the Pacific, the impact of large numbers of nuclear test explosions in the 
atmosphere in the region and the influence of the Australia-set novel of the nuclear 
Apocalypse – On the Beach – is another case in point. 
 
The current state of disarmament 
 
Disarmament has been a central issue on the international agenda since the Hague 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Even after the collapse of the 1932-1934 World Disarmament 
Conference in Geneva and the rise of the dictators, disarmament re-appeared. It first arose in 
the Atlantic Charter and the UN Charter of 1941 and 1945 and in the central machinery of the 
UN. But much of the Cold War interstate effort remained at the superpower level, with civil 
society and non-nuclear states seeking to put a brake on what many saw as a race to 
extinction.  
 
Since the creation of the UN, states‘ track records on disarmament are usually seen as 
insufficient and slim. This perception is partly due to the fact that the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, which is the subject of many General Assembly resolutions, remains a distant goal. 
Saying that disarmament efforts have not borne fruit and only reflect the least common 
denominator among negotiating states, however, leaves out important parts of the equation. A 
fair history would point to the fact that as of January 2016, the UN Office for Disarmament 
Affairs listed on its website no fewer than 25 disarmament treaties that have been negotiated 
since 1945. The verb ‗negotiated‘ is not anodyne as pre-UN disarmament, with the exception 
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the naval disarmament agreements of the interwar period, 
was a tool of punishment imposed upon defeated countries. Within UN forums, disarmament 
took a different dimension and was associated with the more noble objectives of peaceful 
settlement of disputes and economic development. In other words, the UN provided a 
multilateral framework in which countries could negotiate disarmament in good faith and 
with a view to end human suffering caused by armed conflicts. Humanitarian motives have 
always underpinned disarmament efforts, and especially in the global South where citizens 
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were often the victims of wars waged by competing groups armed with weapons provided by 
the North, and in which regimes wasted precious resources on arms rather than poverty 
reduction.  
 
Even though not all of the 25 treaties were negotiated under UN auspices, almost all 
refer to the UN Charter and were designed as measures contributing to the realisation of the 
UN disarmament goals. US – Soviet agreements took place in the context of intense 
international debates, not least in the United Nations. Despite the progress, much remains to 
be done. For example, nuclear weapons, missile defence systems, hypersonic conventional 
weapons and new technologies are all issues that will hardly be tackled without substantial 
political will on all sides. However, from a purely technical perspective these, 25 treaties 
already provide a comprehensive set of measures that can be used to cover all types of 
weapons in a practical manner. Indeed, the international community of states has achieved an 
often overlooked tour de force of developing the necessary know-how for a global system of 
weapons control and disarmament. From small arms and light weapons through confidence- 
and security-building measures (CSBMs) to weapons of mass destruction, every aspect of 
disarmament can be effectively addressed by building on tried and tested achievements in 
disarmament,
14
 a topic elaborated below. 
  
Morgenthau’s perspective on nuclear weapons  
 
Since the splitting of the atom and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
global South has always expressed active concern about nuclear weapons, and disarmament 
is a recurrent theme in all NAM declarations and in General Assembly resolutions sponsored 
by developing countries. The rational for Southern involvement in nuclear disarmament 
seems to be better captured by the late work of Hans Morgenthau. In his A New Foreign 
Policy for the United States, he dedicated a chapter to ―Nuclear Power and Foreign Policy‖ in 
which he makes a very different argument to that attributed to him on the basis of his earlier 
writings.
15
 In this book, Morgenthau contends that: 
 
[T]he rational relationship that existed from the beginning of history to 1945 between 
force as a means and the ends of foreign policy does not apply to nuclear weapons. The 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so enormous that it overwhelms all possible 
objectives of a rational foreign policy.… Their very existence compels us to rethink the 
basic issues of foreign policy. But we continue in large measure to think and act as 





Thus, foreign policy cannot be conducted in a rational manner because of the 
existence of nuclear weapons. Their nuclear nature sets them apart from conventional 
weapons and renders irrational and dangerous any attempt to adapt them to an obsolete mode 
of thought only appropriate to conventional weapons.
17
 Morgenthau presents a dilemma: 
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[W]e have tackled the wrong horn of the nuclear dilemma. Instead of trying in vain to 
assimilate nuclear power to the purposes and the instrumentalities of the nation-state, we 





He also sought new forms of behaviour to accommodate new nuclear realities. His 
post-atomic classical outlook well describes state behaviour since 1945. His enlightened post-
atomic perspective grapples with the pre-atomic perspectives on the edge of the precipice. 
The underlying reasons for the South‘s repeated calls and efforts towards nuclear 
disarmament come from Morgenthau‘s and others awareness of the bomb‘s being a game-
changer in the conduct of world politics. Hence, old conventional thinking could not be 
applied to nuclear weapons. In particular, nuclear powers, for the sake of their own survival, 
needed to embark on a programme of nuclear disarmament. 
 
Southern concerns echo the understanding that the applicability of traditional Realism 
vanished with the bomb, and that states needs should thus temper their actions in a Kantian 
manner out of Realist necessity, a replication of the logic that drove multilateral cooperation 
in the wartime years and the establishment of the United Nations.
19
 The lack of nuclear 
weapons use, especially against non-nuclear states and peoples, is a seriously under-analysed 
phenomenon. Thucydides would have been shocked to find that the USA neither used its 
nuclear monopoly on the USSR nor on China.  The ancients would not have flinched over 
using the bomb to crush the Viet Cong in Hanoi and insurgents in Fallujah fighting their US 
liberators. In the USA, Senator Barry Goldwater may have recommended using tactical 
nuclear weapons in the forests of Southeast Asia, but he lost the presidential election. And by 
2001, although President George W. Bush‘s advisors opined that the toughest policy is the 
best policy, nuclear use in the Middle East was not amongst their policy options. Similarly, 
European states did not deal out nuclear genocide in the postwar period to discipline the 
natives in the manner practiced by the powerful on countless occasions back into antiquity. 
According to the ancient logic of force, the Soviet Union too would have considered using its 
nuclear weapons to bring communism to Afghanistan or to halt the implosion of the Eastern 
bloc. 
 
The 1955 Russell–Einstein manifesto was originally to have been announced in New 
Delhi; it was the first major intellectual declaration of the ideas expressed by Morgenthau. In 
the tradition of naming a concept after its first and most eminent proponent, we can call this 
‗Einstein realism‘, which in fact found widespread public support across the global South as 
shown by the level of personal involvement from NAM leaders such as Yugoslavia‘s Josip 
Broz Tito and India‘s Jawaharlal Nehru who took upon themselves to bring the topic of 
nuclear disarmament to the international agenda—later, of course, India developed a nuclear 
hedge. 
 
With the accession to the restricted nuclear club by China, India and Pakistan, the 
soaring rhetoric in the early NAM pronouncements might have faded away. It has not. 
Indeed, it is still brandished by the non-nuclear members of the global South as a rallying 
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banner against nuclear weapons. Double standards are relevant, but more relevant still is the  
ideal deeply rooted in the global South‘s perception of itself and its vulnerability to the 
irresponsibility of a few nuclear powers, North and South. 
 
Southern activism on disarmament  
 
The history of activism in the global South is most effectively captured by examining 
a set of visible public diplomatic efforts beginning in Bandung and continuing elsewhere.  
 
The Bandung Conference 
 
The end of World War II and the collapse of European empires coincided with the 
emergence of newly independent countries that joined the ranks of well-established countries 
in what is now viewed as the global South. They were already vocal about disarmament 
issues in the 1950s, resulting in the 1955 Bandung Conference. This gathering of Asian and 
African countries offers insights into how the South started organizing itself as a transnational 
political movement and drafting a common agenda to reflect its perceived interests and 
concerns. Whatever their political inclinations, all countries present at Bandung were 
adamant about the importance of disarmament and the United Nations for the preservation of 
world peace and international security. In the final communiqué, states parties declared: 
 
[T]hat universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and 
requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to 
bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, 
including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass 




The rhetoric used by the South was already pointed as the countries present in April 
1955 took upon themselves to lead the disarmament effort on behalf of humanity and 
civilisation. This early awareness of the importance of disarmament lies in the repressive 
colonial history of the global South. As Europe was enjoying an unprecedented period of 
relative peace and prosperity (1815-1914) and expanded its colonial territory to engulf some 
85 per cent of the planet, colonies and even independent countries located in the global South 
experienced the violent military might of European colonial designs.
21
 From the 1856 
bombardment of Canton by the UK to the 1931 Spanish aerial bombardment of Morocco, the 
South experienced the damage and suffering caused by heavy weaponry.
22
 Hence, they saw 
first-hand the necessity to eliminate the lethal tools developed and used by the North to 
impose its will and inflict harm and destruction upon weaker societies.
23
 Noteworthy also is 
the reference to the United Nations as the preferred institutional framework for tackling 
disarmament. Since the Western and Eastern blocs had just begun the Cold War and their 
conception of security was synonymous of modernizing and building up military capabilities, 
the global South sought to bring the North to the disarmament table; and they insisted that 




The declaration of the Bandung Conference was not just a well-meaning though 
insincere commitment to disarmament. The ideas were backed by actions. Southern 
involvement in disarmament affairs both preceding and following Bandung was characterised 
by intense activity inside the United Nations. In the early 1950s, through the First Committee 
of the General Assembly, the South was able to play an influential role in the adoption of the 
1952 Resolution 502 (VI), which established under the Security Council a Disarmament 
Commission with the objectives of regulating, limiting and reducing all armed forces and all 
armaments—for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for 
effective international control of atomic energy. Although the initial proposal was put forward 
by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, countries like Peru and Egypt were 
vocally pushed hard for the inclusion of references to the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction.
24
 Iraq, Pakistan and Syria played a more conciliatory role in the negotiations by 
acting as mediators and trying to bridge the gap between the West and the East. For example, 
they put forward a joint proposal that was later adopted, for the establishment of a 
disarmament sub-committee within the Disarmament Commission as a means of scrutiny and 




The Non-Aligned Movement 
 
Eventually, the evolution of disarmament activism among countries of the global 
South took the form of the Non-Aligned Movement, which provided an ideological 
breakaway from the mainstream West-East thinking and the perfect vector through which the 
South could introduce its initiatives into the international policy arena. Following the 
gathering in Bandung, NAM was formerly established in 1961 at a conference in where 28 
countries from the global South agreed a meaningful final communiqué. The summit  stressed 
the paramount importance of disarmament and put it at the forefront of the group‘s agenda. 
Indeed, the first NAM declaration frames disarmament as an imperative and the most urgent 
task of humankind. This declaration sets out a collective agenda unanimously agreed by the 
participating countries about several issues deemed of vital interest. First, NAM participants 
adopted a comprehensive understanding of disarmament whereby general and complete 
disarmament meant the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture 
of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for 
purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and 
utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well 
as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and 
operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories. Second, they called 
upon all states, and those exploring outer space in particular, to undertake to use outer space 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. Third, they urged the great powers to sign without further 
delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save humankind from the 
scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used 
for the peaceful economic and social development of all. Fourth, they considered that all 
discussions on disarmament should be held under UN auspices. Finally, they declared 
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essential an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests and a 




These points formed the core of NAM‘s agenda and explicitly set the priorities of the 
movement. The pre-eminence of disarmament as a theme of foreign policy among NAM 
countries reflects several factors directly linked to the issues raised in the declaration. The 
first factor is a common understanding that in the context of the Cold War the nuclear arms 
race was the primary menace facing the global South.
27
 Tito and Nehru among others were 
persuaded that in the absence of a programme of global disarmament, the two arch-rivals in 
Washington and Moscow would collide and bring chaos to the rest of the world.
28
 Indeed, at 
the end of the Belgrade Conference on behalf of NAM, Tito and Nehru went on a mediation 
mission respectively to the USA and the USSR to initiate détente between the superpowers 
and find ways to disarm. The economic aspect of disarmament was another factor that led 
NAM to engage in disarmament. Economic development was seen as the key that would 
extract those countries from a low-level income trap and propel them on a more prosperous 
path. Hence, NAM‘s interest was in framing disarmament and development as two sides of 
the same coin. It saw the arms race as a huge drain on resources and energy that could have 





Another factor was NAM‘s intention to play a more assertive role in the conduct of 
world politics.
30
 It did not want to be excluded from decision making and therefore 
emphasised and re-emphasised the universal United Nations as the sole international forum 
for disarmament.
31
 The NAM understood that its voice would weigh more if Southern 
countries were coordinated and used common channels to advance their interests. Even 
though the UN was characterised by asymmetric power relations—especially in the Security 
Council between the five permanent members and the rest—the world organisation still 
offered a platform on which all states were represented and, if organised in large groups, 
could influence the conduct of world politics. This UN potential was explored by NAM, and 
its members learned how to use the system to their own advantage. NAM‘s concern about the 
use of outer space and the undertaking of nuclear tests by the great powers was also a factor 
of its involvement in disarmament. The choice of tackling these two issues was motivated by 
the necessity to avoid any kind of collateral damage resulting from the modernisation of 
nuclear weapons. From 1945 to 1963, the nuclear powers had carried out the bulk of their 
nuclear tests above ground, in the atmosphere (both at sea-level and higher altitudes) and in 
outer space. The radioactive fall-out from those tests had obvious detrimental effects on the 
populations and environment close to the zone of detonations. The NAM collectively worried 
about side-effects and decided to pressure the nuclear powers to halt their tests. Even before 





 At the insistence of the global South, whose members saw an East-West monopoly of 
disarmament as undermining both their role and the UN‘s role on the international scene, the 
Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, exclusively composed by Northern countries, was 
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called upon to reform and include member states from the South.
33
 This reform led to the 
creation of the 18 Nation Committee on Disarmament (1961-1969) that included seven 
nonaligned or soon to be nonaligned countries: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, 
Nigeria and Egypt.
34
 In this forum, NAM managed to successfully pursue its disarmament 
objectives. The first of its indirect achievements was the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
signed in 1963 by the USA, USSR and UK. During the sixth meeting of the Committee on 
Disarmament in March 1962, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burma (later Myanmar) demanded that top 
priority be given to the question of stopping nuclear tests and led the debate.
35
 At the end of 
this session, the decision was to set up a sub-committee composed of the USSR, USA, and 
UK to consider the question of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.
36
 It is the 
work done by this sub-committee, which was set up under the impetus of NAM countries that 
finally allowed for the signature of the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Five years later, 
in 1968, NAM countries again played a significant role in another disarmament process that 
became a landmark disarmament treaty: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In fact, the draft 
NPT jointly presented by the USA and the USSR reflected useful suggestions made by NAM 
members in the 18 Nation Committee on Disarmament.
37
 The superpower competition for 
NAM support provided the political space that NAM states, in concert with Western civil 
society and some neutral states, used to advance debate about controlling the bomb.  
 
Since the 1960s, disarmament issues have been put on the back burner while others 
have been added to the NAM agenda—in particular, the establishment of nuclear weapon free 
zones;
38
 the implementation of negative security assurances;
39
 the use of nonproliferation 
measures by the North to prevent the South from acquiring and developing peaceful nuclear 
technology;
40
 the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
41
 enhancing nuclear safety and 
security at facilities utilising radioactive materials;
42
 and the use of WMD by terrorist 
groups.
43
 Whatever the shifts in geopolitics or diverging national interests, NAM has 
consistently maintained its disarmament agenda and pushed for all disarmament issues 
identified and agreed to be brought to UN machinery and acted upon.  
 
Other Southern-led disarmament efforts 
 
The Argentinian-Brazilian experience in upholding nuclear disarmament is unique in 
the sense that two regional powers contending for the title of regional hegemon in South 
America have managed to transcend security concerns and renounce going down the path of 
nuclearisation. 
 
South Africa stands out as a state that acquired nuclear weapons with Western 
assistance, refused to recognise this publicly, and with a new regime managed its unilateral 
elimination under international safeguards. The African National Congress did not regard 
retention of the bomb as a ticket to enter the UN Security Council, or acquire definitive 
leadership in Africa and NAM. Indeed, their position was quite the opposite. 
 
African and Caribbean states, for their part, have contributed to reducing violence due 
to small arms and light weapons. The Central African Convention offers a framework for the 
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control of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and all parts and components that 
can be used for their manufacture, repair and assembly. The Arms Trade Treaty would not 
have been brought to light without the involvement and leadership shown by Caribbean 
States, in particular former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias continues pushing for the issue 
of arms transfer at the UN. 
 
Tensions between new political aspirations and old ideals 
 
The history of the global South and disarmament is in many respects paradoxical. 
Although always very sharp in their criticism of the arms race and eloquent in condemning 
the actions of a few Northern countries behaving according to their own rules, many Southern 
countries were themselves behaving in ways that contradicted the very values that they 
espoused on the international stage. Competing political aspirations and international ideals 
revolved around proposing a different world order where the North‘s propensity to resort to 
force to impose its will could be kept in check characterised the South‘s relationship with 
disarmament. In other words, diverging political interests among Southern countries and their 
search for regional influence and international status led certain developing countries to move 
away from disarmament while still supporting old liberal and internationalist visions and 
advocating for disarmament at the United Nations. 
 
 The 1947-1948 Indo-Pakistani War left lasting traces in South Asia and dramatically 
altered the security dynamics between the two major powers in the region. Afterwards both 
countries engaged in a sustained effort to develop their respective military capabilities with 
the objective to acquire the means to prevail in future conflicts. The standoff was to a certain 
extent similar to the West-East standoff, with two blocs or, in this particular instance, two 
countries, engaged in a race to build up their defensive and offensive capacities, thereby 
acquiring the potential to precipitate both countries into a suicidal conflict. The Indian and 
Pakistani disarmament rhetoric, based on the sensible argument that the arms race was the 
main obstacle to peace and that disarmament, would pave the way to reduce tensions and 
build trust simultaneously stood in stark contrast with their own actions on the ground.  
China‘s accession to the nuclear armed states club in the early 1960s and the Indian defeat in 
the brief Indo-Chinese war of 1962 provided India and subsequently Pakistan with further 
impetus for the development of the atomic bomb.
44
 Deterrence was the main rhetorical reason 
behind their acquisition of nuclear weapons, but it failed to avert the 1999 Indo-Pakistani War 
and repeated skirmishes on the border in 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015. With the failure of 
deterrence and the impossibility of fitting nuclear weapons into a rational foreign policy, 
India and Pakistan were left with a weapon that put them in an awkward position. Indeed, 
their nuclear status, still not formally recognized by the UN Security Council, set them apart 
from the rest of the NAM countries and excluded them from certain UN-sponsored 
multilateral forums such as the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Long 
standing Chinese support for the Pakistan programme was mirrored by that of the USSR for 
India, until the George W. Bush administration set aside NPT norms and made a long-term 
agreement to support India‘s nuclear energy programme. 
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The persistence of tensions and armed conflicts among countries in the global South 
weakened their otherwise strong moral challenge to the arms race initiated by the North.
45
 
Although still the subject of many speeches and declarations by the global South, the noble 
aspiration of strengthening international security through disarmament has been the victim of 
the pursuit of influence and security through the accumulation of hard power. This 
geopolitical reality has led many to go down the path of heavy militarisation. Egypt, Syria 
and Iraq, to mention just a few, are all good examples of this hypocritical relationship. They 
vehemently protested, for example, the Israeli and South African WMD programmes, and the 
assistance provided by the West on the grounds that neither quantitative additions nor 
qualitative improvements reduced a state‘s vulnerability or led to absolute security, and that 
political objectives cannot be achieved by military means.
46
 Hence, they proposed the rational 
option to seek security for all through total nuclear disarmament, elimination of other 
weapons of mass destruction, and through the balanced and progressive reductions of 
conventional armaments at the global and regional levels.
47
 However, they were 
simultaneously pursuing covert WMD programmes, which undermined the very disarmament 
norms that they promoted.  
 
This rhetorical adoption and practical rejection of disarmament compromised 
credibility and led to the obvious charge of hypocrisy. What was meant to be a global 
disarmament effort led by the global South in order to bring the nuclear powers of the North 
to reverse its destructive course of action turned out to be a disarmament menu à la carte from 
which the nuclear powers in the South could pick and choose their favourite disarmament 
topic and disregard others. China‘s possession and its half-hearted response to North Korea‘s 
development of nuclear weapons was perhaps the most obvious manifestation. While the 
DPKR nuclear program does represent a major hurdle in their relationship, as highlighted by 
China‘s repeated condemnations of North Korea‘s nuclear tests and its adoption of UN 
Security Council sanctions, China has always maintained a strategic partnership with the 
regime in Pyongyang. From that point it follows that keeping the status quo in the Korean 
peninsula seems more important to Beijing than upholding disarmament and non-
proliferation norms and preventing a strategic ally from developing its nascent nuclear 
capability. 
 
The issue of Iran‘s nuclear weapons potential has been one of the most publicly 
important issues in global politics for a quarter of a century. Iran‘s nuclear programme, 
including a full nuclear fuel cycle, was encouraged by the USA during the rule by the Shah 
but abruptly changed with the regime in Tehran. Amidst rumours of war against Iran by both 
the USA and Israel, diplomacy was derided and failed repeatedly. A Track II conversation 
over a number of years about the UN goal of the Middle East Nuclear and WMD Free Zone 
(MEWMDFZ), engaged senior officials past and present. Pessimism reigned at various 
points, notably after the US–UK invasion of Iraq and prior to Ariel Sharon‘s coma, which 
seemed to lead from contingency planning to practical measures.
48
 A fortunate juxtaposition 
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of a post-Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Iran and a second term for the Barack Obama 
administration provided the impetus and diplomatic skill necessary to complete an agreement. 
 
Mark Fitzpatrick has itemised ways that the agreement helps disarmament and 
nonproliferation. Diplomacy worked in a process that engaged the P5 and the European 
Union. The Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency worked.  An 
enhanced verification system was created and can help in other cases. The NPT has been 
strengthened because its provisions provided an agreed normative context within which Iran 
agreed to remain and without making explicit reference to the ‗right‘ to uranium enrichment. 
The Iranian agreement‘s provisions arguably enhanced possibilities in other diplomatic arenas 
including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, 
and the MEWMDFZ.  Other states in the region have a reduced incentive to pursue 
technologies that provide the basis for a nuclear weapons programme. Fitzpatrick concludes: 
 
Finally, the Iran nuclear deal is a game-changer in many regards. Among other things, it 
showed the willingness of states to overcome animosities. Throughout my professional 
career, which started the year of the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran, the 




The successful outcome of the negotiations that were viewed as impossible opens the 
question of how this success could be built upon. 
 
Conclusion: towards a Renaissance of Southern-supported disarmament 
 
The global South has maintained a paradoxical relationship with disarmament. Born 
out of a genuine interest and an awareness of the necessity to get the great powers of the 
North to stop destructive arm races, disarmament was seen as a politically desirable tool to 
enhance the security in the South as for the nuclear weapon free zones or the partial and 
comprehensive test ban treaties. At times, the lofty rhetoric was also misused to justify the 
acquisition and development of various weapons when promises to disarm were made on the 
condition that other countries engaged in disarmament first. A façade of good intentions 
concealed the policies to accumulate more hard power could be pursued. 
 
 Although disarmament sometimes clashed with behaviour, the global South has 
nevertheless pushed the UN‘s disarmament agenda. General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions on disarmament bear the South‘s imprint. In fact, as the North has stepped back 
from its disarmament commitments on various occasion—such as the US withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Russia‘s suspending participation in the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe—the South has managed to keep disarmament goals 
alive at the United Nations. 
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Today‘s political context is one in which a growing number of more lethal 
conventional weapons are in daily use in both civil and international wars, while an arms race 
continues in the Middle East and South and East Asia. Meanwhile, those states with nuclear 
weapons are introducing new ones. It is left to Henry Kissinger to observe that we survived 





 These dynamics alone justify new directions in policy to meet the long-standing goal 
of general and complete disarmament. The subject of speeches by world leaders could build 
upon more intensive disarmament efforts in the global South. These should include an 
emphasis on UN Charter Articles 11 and 26 and NPT Paragraph VI, which pave the way for 
the conceptualisation of a diplomatic and technical strategy founded in confidence- and 
security-building measures, the elimination of WMD, and the regulation and reduction of 
existing and future conventional weapons. A step in this direction took place under the 
heading of ‗SCRAP.51 Fulfilling the objective of general and complete disarmament of course 
requires political will, but the mere existence of these options can begin to change political 
dynamics as looming crises are starting to drive leaders, governments and the public to search 
for more non-military solutions in an unstable and crisis-prone environment. 
 
A starting point is to use best practice for the future. In the area of WMD, the Security 
Council mandated an inspection system on Iraq, which is now a tested and successful 
mechanism that states can voluntarily adhere. As such, it can fulfil the nuclear dimension of 
NPT Article VI, in addition drawing on the experience of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties and various supplier regimes. 
Additionally, the provisions of CSBMs being developed in the Organization of American 
States and MERCOSUR (Mercado Comum do Sul) have wide applicability, as does the 
unexplored potential of satellite and drone imagery while land and air exercises and forces 
covered by the Vienna Accords could be developed to encompass both space-launch and 
naval forces. At the lower end of technology, one could enhance the Programme of Action on 
Small Arms and Light Weapons with provisions on transparency developed in the Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT).  
 
Thus, the know-how for a global system of weapons control and disarmament exists. 
From the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World 
that was part of the John F. Kennedy administration's diplomatic response to the Berlin Wall 
through to the ATT and the recent Security Council resolution 2231 on the Iranian nuclear 
programme, the international community of states has accumulated a wealth of technical 
knowledge and practical procedures that ought to be exploited—in fact, much remains to be 
done within the mandate of past disarmament agreements. From small arms and light 
weapons through CSBMs to WMD, aspects of disarmament can be effectively addressed by 
building on tested precedents. Past agreements already provide a comprehensive set of 
measures that can be adjusted to cover all types of weapons in a practical manner.  
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Transformative normative efforts of this sort can contribute to the original and still 
central mission of international relations, the prevention of global war rather than in honing 
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